CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE CASE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES by Dima, Bogdan et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE CASE OF
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Bogdan Dima and Mihai Mutascu and Cosmin Enache
West University of Timisoara, West University of Timisoara, West
University of Timisoara
2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5688/
MPRA Paper No. 5688, posted 10. November 2007 03:00 UTC
CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
Bogdan Dima * 
Mihai Mutaşcu * 
Cosmin Enache * 
 
* West University of Timisoara, Faculty of Economics, Finance Department 
16 Pestalozzi Street, Timisoara, 300115, Romania, 
Tel. +040/256 - 592 - 556, Int.556 
E-mail addresses: bogdan.dima@fse.uvt.ro, 
bogdandima2001@yahoo.com, mihai.mutascu@fse.uvt.ro, mmutascu@yahoo.it, 
cosmin.enache@fse.uvt.ro 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The economic growth is based on a complex set of determinants, inside which the “pure” 
economic variables plays an important but not unique role. The “soft” factors like information 
and social institutions, rules and behaviours, as well as the elements of the dominant cultural 
paradigm could not be easily included in the “and others” category. 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to provide a possible framework for the analysis of this type of 
determinants, able to deal especially with the interactions between culture and growths.  
 
Part I deals with the theoretical foundation by argue that “in long run” the social dynamic is not 
influenced only by resources and technology but also by the way in which the social actors 
interact in the primary distribution of the resources and in their social reallocation taking into 
account the cultural restrictions and requirements.  
 
Part II is an attempt to examine some empirical evidences in the favour of some results derived 
from this foundation. 
The main conclusion of the paper could be resumed by the thesis that the process of the 
sustainable growth could not be comparer with a linear voyage in a modern train “from here to 
eternity”. Rather is a trip into unknown with a colour and noisy caravan. 
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JEL Classification: O1, C5, E6, Z1 
 
 
1. The problem 
 
 
Social development architecture is based on a complex set of factors. Some of these are “hard” 
factors (the territory, the population, the natural resources, the technology), and some of these are 
“soft” factors (quality of institutional system, social customs, the behaviour and the other 
components of dominant “cultural paradigm”). 
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Traditionally, the literature has focused on the first category of factors. The different analyses and 
the given solutions tried to draw a “vertical” economic growth model. This kind of approach 
offers too few answers to a crucial question: how can we explain the fact that two economic 
systems, identically endowed with resources, have, in the long run, different performances? 
One of the most credible ways to explain such differences is to take into account the connections 
that relate social and legal conditions to economic well being. These connections are still treated 
in a diversity of approaches. As KANATAS and STEFANIDIS [2005;p.2] notes: „ This 
literatures follows two main approaches. The first identifies the protection of private property 
rights as critical for economic prosperity...the second approach has received much attention from 
sociologists and emphasizes a society’s culture and work ethic as important determinants of 
economic development and growth...”. 
In our opinion, the property rights nature or the ethics of labour are components of a cultural 
paradigm – a model used in collective mindset to establish the values hierarchy, which defines 
the social space. If we take this into account we could develop a unifying conceptual framework, 
which could enlight the behavioural and institutional aspect of durable economic growth. 
 
Following this approach, the paper intends: (i) to address some questions about the differences 
between the economic growth and the durable economic development; (ii) to propose a model of 
the resources allocation as a critical engine of the long run evolution of an economic system 
inside the social mandate framework; (iii) to advance some possible explanations for the links 
between the cultural paradigm and the social mandate for a durable growth. 
 
 
2. Growth and development 
 
 
Growth is a complex phenomenon that still remains a continuing challenge for the economists. 
Over the years, economists like SCHUMPETER [1951], KUZNETS [1966, 1971, 1977], 
SOLOW [1956], DENNISON [1966], LUCAS [1988], BARRO [1996], ROMER [1986, 1987, 
1990] and others tried to explain the economic and social determinants of growth. But even 
today, we do not fully understand why some countries get rich and others stay poor. As TANZI 
& SCHUKNECHT [2003] puts it, “the miracle of growth remains as mysterious as most miracles 
and attempts to explain it through the behaviour of single or few variables (capital, labour, 
technology, human capital, etc.) often prove disappointing”. 
 
After some important punctual contribution on growth economics made by classic economists 
such as SMITH, RICARDO or MARK, the first serious contribution on growth theory was 
represented by the Harrod-Domar model (HARROD [1939], DOMAR [1946, 1947]). They 
considered that investments are not only an autonomous component of demand, but also a key 
factor to boost supply. In this context, the equilibrium in the goods market is reached when the 
rate of increase in investment equals the ratio between the average propensity to save and the 
capital output ratio (the so-called “warranted rate of growth”). This model encountered two major 
problems. First, if the firms expect demand to grow at a rate different than the warranted one, this 
could cause an excess demand or an excess supply (HARROD’s instability). Second, having in 
mind that the natural rate of growth is given by the sum of the growth rate of population and the 
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rate of output growth per employed person due to technical progress, there is not an automatic 
mechanism to ensure the convergence of the natural and warranted rate of growth. 
 
Neoclassical economists removed the Keynesian hypothesis regarding the independence of 
investment decision. In this new framework, using the variability of capital-output ratio as the 
automatic convergence mechanism, SOLOW [1956] solved the convergence problem and 
showed that the warranted rate of growth will tend to the natural one. In the economy, if the 
firm’s expectations are not important anymore, as in the previous models, then growth will be 
influenced by the availability of production factors (capital and labour). 
 
Post-Keynesian approach for analysing growth is based on the idea that there is a connection 
between capital accumulation and income distribution. In this context, the convergence 
mechanism is given by the variability of the average propensity to save determined by the 
changes in income distribution. So, all the factors that are influencing income distribution have 
an impact on growth. 
 
The different growth theories presented above do not put the problem of long-run growth. All of 
these theories consider the long-run growth determinants as given (exogenous growth). Starting 
from this point, a new strand of growth theory was born: endogenous growth theories. ROMER 
[1986] proposed as a key factor for growth the technological progress as the outcome of learning 
by doing. ROMER [1987, 1990] GROSSMAN and HELPMAN [1991] took this line of thought 
further, by studying the impact on growth of the progress generated by specific research and 
development activities aimed at appropriating all of the benefits deriving from a monopoly on 
knowledge. LUCAS [1988] showed that human capital and also plays an important role in the 
growth of an economy. 
 
In recent years, an important body of academic work emphasized the importance in the growth 
process of a diversity of social factors (such as life expectancy, fertility rate, accumulation of 
human capital, urbanization, religious affiliation), political factors (propensity to enjoy 
democracy or political rights), and economic factors (natural resources, inflation). 
 
But, despite these theoretical efforts, the empirical evidence does not fully explain the core 
determinants of the growth of economies. Although, there are many empirical studies, which 
links the growth rate by a variety of factors: economical, social or political.  
BARRO [1996] proved for a panel of around 100 countries, with data from 1960 to 1996, that for 
a given starting level of real per capita GDP, the growth rate is enhanced by higher initial 
schooling and life expectancy, lower fertility, lower government consumption, better 
maintenance of the rule of law, lower inflation, and improvements in the terms of trade. Also, the 
obtained results show that, in countries with low levels of political rights, an increase in political 
freedom fosters the economic growth.  
Recently, a major attempt a i m e d  at explaining the Sources of Economic Growth in OECD 
Countries has been made by the OECD [2003]. This study has looked at many factors that may 
contribute to growth. Its major conclusion is that “long-term sustainable economic growth has 
many sources and cannot be fully steered by policy-makers”.  
 
An important issue related to economic growth is development. If growth could be quantified by 
the increase in income or in material wealth of a country, development is a much broader 
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concept, which integrates also some social aspects like reduction of poverty, health 
improvements, life expectancy, education, the environment. As ACOCELLA [2001] considers, 
development occurs when human well-being improves. The best measure of development so far 
is the Human Development Index proposed by the UNITED NATIONS [1990], which 
concentrates three essential elements of human life: longevity, level of knowledge and living 
standard. 
 
 
3. The mandate theory and the resources allocation: the „oasis model” 
 
 
 In our previous paper (TALPOS et al [2005;p.5]), we had defined the state as the dominant 
agencies under a certain social space as follows: “The state” represents the macro-agency or the 
dominant agency of exerting “natural” and “achieved” rights, overtaken from social subjects 
from certain territory, formed by voluntary association of a number of individual agencies or as a 
result of some violent actions against other agencies, against their clients or against own clients, 
which could limit by effects and temporarily any breaking of its monopoly by other existing or 
virtual entities, and which is authorized by its clients, for preventive goals, to action in a re-
distributive manner for the non-members”. This paper deals with the last point concerning the 
involvement of the agency in the control and (re) distribution of the social vital resources. More 
exactly, we are trying to formulate a possible answer to the next questions: what are the 
mechanisms that underlying the involvement of the agency in the production, primary 
distribution and redistribution of a certain set of   resources that are critical for the social 
development? How could this involvement be justified in the frame of the “social contract”? 
What are the components of the dominant “cultural paradigm” which influence a certain manner 
of the agency to exercise its (re) distributive powers?  
The output of the paper could be synthesized by the thesis that the agency activities as a (re) 
distribution social centre depends both on its prerogatives included in the “social contract” as this 
is formal formulated as well as on the power relations with its individual clients, with negotiation 
associations / parallel associations and with non-members and are modulated in concordance 
with the dominant paradigm. 
As a starting point, let’s examine some conditions in which the primary and secondary 
distributions of the social resources could take place. Suppose, for instance, that there is a social 
space formatted in a desert environment with a single water resource. The members of this social 
space had transferred their achieved right of oasis exploitation because their own costs associated 
with this activity, ( )xk −1 , are higher than the agency ones ( ( )βα ,,xak  -with x being the fraction 
of the specific achieved right which is transferred to the agency and the last two parameters,α  
the number of members of an individual agency and β  the number of associated agencies which 
form the dominant macro-agency, standing for the institutional costs -“organization costs”, as 
well as “coordination costs”- ). Let 1=x  so that the delegation is totally. If the social utility of 
each water unit is equal with w  and the fraction of water exploitation output kept by the agency 
for its own member is aw , the “net” utility derived from the delegation for an individual social 
subject will be ( ) ( ) ( )011 ii kwawu +−=  and the “relative” utility will be expressed 
as ( ) ( ) ( )( )0
011
i
i
i kw
kwaw
ru
−
+−
= . The equivalent utility for the agency is ( ) ( )βα,,1*1 akwawau −= . 
 5 
Suppose that the cost of the agency as well as the equivalent costs for the individual subject vary 
along the path ( ) ( )( )tktak , from state “0” to state “1” ( ( ) ( )tktak ,  are assumed to be differentiable 
in t ). The change in the global social “net” utility, ( )1;0ug∆ , is represented by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
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Let ( )1;0ak∆ be the change in the average individual costs of oasis exploitation in the transition 
from one state to the other one: 
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Relation (2) summarizes the first delegation condition: 
:0C The delegation will took place as long as the changes in the agency cost does not generate a 
decrease in the global social “net” utility below the one provided by an individual water 
production. 
Formally, the relationships between the agency and its clients could be synthesized in a “social 
contract” which should include a minimal set of elements such as: 
 The list of the basic social services provided by the agency (water extraction, transport to 
the individual subjects areas or water preservation); 
 The costs of some supplementary services (protection against water thieves’ actions); 
 The amount and the mechanism of the preventive compensation paid to the non-members, 
which have no access to the oasis. 
The existence of the preventive compensation will modify the “net” and the “relative” utility for 
an individual subject ( ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )NMkwNMsawu ii ,,10,111 θΛ++−−= ,  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1
,,0,111
i
i
i kw
NMxkwNMsaw
ru
−
Λ++−−
=
θ
- with s  the level of the compensation as a 
function of the non-members number and Λ  the cost beard by the agency for 
guarding/recuperating the potential output claimed by the non-members) but not necessary the 
dynamic of the global social “net” utility since it does not modify the individual / agency 
production costs1. 
                                                 
1
 The necessity of such compensation is justified in TALPOS et al [2005; p.7] as follows:” … the existence of other 
non-members of the agency, NMX  would generate, for its clients the risk of an attempt to get hold of the output of 
the exerting of their rights equivalent to a part 0 or the whole. If the cost beard by the agency for 
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The contract should also include the re-negotiation mechanism: if there are significant changes in 
the water production/distribution and/or there are new reports with the non-members the fraction 
aw  and /or the level and the conditions of the preventive compensation should be subjects of a 
reformulation in order to adequate them to these modifications. Of course, any major 
reformulation of the contract will involve some specific costs ( ( )βα ,,awrn ) so that it will 
generate a comparative reduction in the global social “net” to the previous state and it could be 
initiated only if: 
( ) ( )( )( )
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So that 
the condition 0C could be reformulated as follows: 
:0
'C The delegation will took place as long as the changes in the agency cost does not generate a 
decrease in the global social “net” utility below the one provided by an individual water 
production. The re-negotiation of the relations between the clients (as principals) and agency (as 
agent) in the water production and distribution could take place only if the involved costs does 
not diminished the global social “net” utility bellow a certain (“zero”) critical level. 
So far, the “draft” of the foundation describes a situation in which the agency is delegate to use a 
single critical social resource, to distribute the output to its members and to pay a preventive 
compensation to the non-members. There are at least to “hidden hypothesis”: 1) there are only 
three groups that claims or could claims the water (the clients, the agency’s members and the 
non-members);  
2) there are not any type individual exploitation costs lower that the agency’s ones so that there is 
no economic justification for a private water production/distribution and the delegation is 
complete. 
But how “realistic” is such a postulate framework? For instance, it is hard to imagine that there is 
no condition for parallel associations to initiate a private activity in the oasis2. From a pure 
“economic” perspective, such activity could take place if there are some individual costs that 
fulfill the condition: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )4
2
,,1,1*0
0,,10,11
NMwNMswawk
kwNMkwNMsaw
i
ii
θ
θ
Λ−+≤⇒
−≤Λ++−−
  
Or in other words: 
:1C A parallel association could initiate a private exploitation of a critical social resource if its 
own costs are lower than a certain amount (“half”) of the sum between the outputs kept by the 
agency for its members and the “net” preventive/guarding cost (the difference of the preventive 
compensation and the guarding/recuperating cost). 
                                                                                                                                                              
guarding/recuperating this output ( )NMx ,,θΛ  are superior to the preventive compensation that the agency would 
decide to pay to non-members because the output of their rights is inferior to that equivalent for its clients 
( ( )NM,xs ) or if the recuperation, partial or integral, of the output achieved is not possible, then, it seems logical 
that 1X  would permit the agency to act in a redistributive manner”. 
2
 For the conditions involve, see also TALPOS et al [2005]. 
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The claim from the condition 1C  must be more careful analysed.  As is mentioned in TALPOS et 
al [2005; p.13]: “Thus, clients will choose to exert their rights extra-territorially, outside the 
agency only if the gained output surplus will exceed the costs of renouncing the delegation of the 
rights as well as the penalties imposed by the agency ( )ιτξ ,,x ”. The question of such penalties is 
an important one. Indeed, it could be admitted that there is a low probability that the agency will 
admit a private exploitation of the resources from some of its clients due to a set of reasons. The 
most simple and evident of them consists in the fact that if there could appear an imitation effect: 
if a certain number of clients decide to leave the agency their actions could be imitated by others 
members in a multiplicative chain. However, the penalties are applied as long as the cost 
( )ιτψ ,,x
 
of application is inferior to the fraction of output lost by the agency. If this condition is 
fulfilled and the agency decides to take measures against the defeating clients, the relation should 
be modified as follows: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )'4
2
,,,,1,1*0
0,,0,,10,11
ιτξθ
ιτξθ
xNMwNMswawk
xkwNMkwNMsaw
i
ii
+Λ−+≤⇒
−−≤Λ++−−
 
:1
'C A parallel association could initiate a private exploitation of a critical social resource if its 
own costs are lower than a certain amount (“half”) of the sum between the outputs kept by the 
agency for its members, the “net” preventive/guarding cost (the difference of the preventive 
compensation and the guarding/recuperating cost) and the penalties imposed by the agency to 
the defeating clients. 
Of course, any private activity will require a certain availability of the technical means for water 
production/distribution: a parallel association could act if :(i) there is a technology which could 
be obtain and used at a efficiency level that is, at least, comparable with the agency conditions; 
(ii) there are individual subjects that have the necessary knowledge/ skills and they agree to quite 
the agency in the favour of the association. Even more, (iii) the distribution conditions could not 
be, from the association clients’ point of view, less favourable that the ones that could be obtain 
from the agency. 
These conditions are necessary but not sufficient for the existence of the private water 
production/distribution. Indeed, suppose that there are some naturally phenomena that reduce the 
total volume of water that could be extract from the oasis so that the potential output  of the 
current period will be inferior to previous periods one. In order to prevent a diminution of the 
water supply, the agency could stockpile a part of the fraction aw distributed to its own members 
in water abundance periods or, alternatively, could produce more than the social aggregate 
demand for this purpose3. Indifferent of the adopted solution, the entire idea could appear as a 
                                                 
3
 Apparently, the second solution could be seen as the favorite one. But it should be remember that any increase of 
the variable costs induce by a supplementary production will leads to a lower net result of the agency activity 
according to a descending return’s evolution up to a certain critical volume of water production. As a consequence, 
the members of the agency could accept a smaller fraction of the output in order to preserve the global agency’ 
efficiency, depending on the relations between the agency and its members.  If the agency had the position of the 
dominant macro-agency only for a short time period and its capacity to control the clients’ demands is still weak, it 
could be forced to face the clients’ fears that any supplementary water extraction could endanger the oasis 
environment and to accepted a reduction in aw for prudential reasons. If, per a contrario, the agency is consolidated 
and the capacity of the individual clients to negotiate a better environmental preservation is reduced, the adopted 
solution will be more in the favor of the agency’s members (still, the actions of negotiating associations interested in 
the environment preservation should be taken into account). 
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controversial one: what is the ultimate reason to constitute prudential water stocks? On can 
suppose that there is a special clause of the social contract where is mentioned a fixed quantity of 
water that should be produced and distributed each time period. But how “naturally” is such a 
clause in the logic of the advanced framework?  
The relations (1) and (2) make no assumptions concerning a time dependency of the w : the 
changes in the global social “net” utility do not depend on the unitary individual utility that 
remains unchanged over the time. Such statement does not hide the fact that the perception of this 
utility has an important “subjective” component: if there is a decrease in the available quantity of 
water, the social subjects could or could not modify the estimated level of each water unit utility. 
If this is true, a formal specification of the periodical water production could be inserted in the 
social contract only if the social subjects adjust their perceptions about water utility according to 
the changes in the water supply and wants to preserve a certain level of utility in a multi-periodic 
time framework. If there is no formal clause, the existence of prudential water stocks will 
depends on the agency decisions: it could try to preserve for its clients a “target” level of the 
utility or it could forced them to correspondently adjust it at least as long as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )51,,1
,,1*1,,1* 0011
skakwaw
akwawskakwaw
−∆≥∆⇒
−≥+−
βα
βαβα
 
where sk  is the corresponding costs of water stockpiling. 
Thus: 
:2C If there is an adjustment in the perceived utility of a water unit connected with the changes in 
the global level of water production, such adjustment could take place as long as the “positive” 
variation of the utility will remain higher than the difference between the agency’s costs 
variation and the costs of water stockpiling. 
If the agency decides to proceeds to a prudential stockpiling of the water, what will happen with 
the members of a parallel association? Briefly speaking, at least two solutions could be adopted 
in this case: (1) the association could decided to preserve itself a certain amount of water and to 
support the corresponding costs, ska ; (2) the members of the association could decide to transfer 
to the agency a certain amount of their current output, skt , designed in this purpose. 
The main question here consists in the difference between ska  and skt . Indeed, let’s suppose that 
the water preservation reclaim the construction of one or more reservoirs and other 
supplementary expenses. If the agency is able to build such reservoirs at lower costs that the 
association ones, then it will makes sense to choose the solution (2) if: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )6
00 0011
skasktkw
kskawksktw
−≤∆−∆⇒
−−≤−−
 
:3C The relative preference of a parallel association for a prudential water stockpiling realized 
by the agency will appear if the variation of its own “net” utility is lower than the difference 
between the values of its output transferred in this purpose to the agency and the presumed costs 
supported if the association decides to preserve itself the water . 
The same logic could be applied to the problem of the preventive compensation paid by the 
associations: any private activity implies not only a renouncement at the production/distribution 
services provided by the agency but also at the compensation paid by it. As a consequence, there 
should be initiated some alternative mechanisms to prevent any attempt of non-members to claim 
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a certain fraction of the association output4. But such mechanisms will involve specific costs 
supported by the associations. As in the case of the prudential water stockpiling, they could 
decide to support it themselves or to translate it, partially or totally, to the agency. 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )70,,
000,, 0011
Λ−Λ≤∆−∆⇒
−Λ−≤−Λ−
NMxkw
kwkNMxw
θ
θ
 
where ( )0Λ  is the fraction of the of the associations’ output which could be the subject of 
potential claims from the non-members or others associations. 
 :4C  The relative preference of a parallel association to transfer the payment of the preventive 
compensation to the agency could be non-null if the variation of its own “net” utility is lower 
than the difference between the values of its output transferred in this purpose to the agency and 
the presumed costs supported if the association decides to pay itself this compensation. 
The conditions 3C and 4C could be combined into a single one as follows: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )80,,
000,, 0011
Λ−Λ+−≤∆−∆⇒
−Λ−−≤−Λ−−
NMxskasktkw
kskawkNMxsktw
θ
θ
 
:5C  The relative preference of a parallel association to entrust to the agency a mandate for a 
prudential water stockpiling as well as for the payment of the preventive compensation is 
manifested if the variation of its own “net” utility is lower than the difference between the values 
of its output transferred in this purpose to the agency and the presumed costs supported if the 
association decides to preserve itself the water and to pay itself the compensation. 
The main idea behind the 5C is that there are at least to reasons (with a prudential nature- the 
stockpiling of the water and the payment of the preventive compensation) for which the 
associations could take into consideration the transfer of a fraction of their output in the favor of 
the agency in the framework of a certain mandate even if there is no transfer of the achieved right 
for the water production/distribution.  
At this stage, we conclude that the agency is entitlement to collect a certain fraction of the social 
output both from its own clients as well from the associations and to redistribute a part of this in 
the favor of the non-members. It should be noted the fact that from the advanced argumentation 
the relations between the agency, associations and non-members are based on mutual 
agreements: all parts involved in such relations have their own motivations for the output 
transfer. But is this the complete picture? Could be there situations in which the initiative for the 
transfers is formulated solely by the agency? 
In TALPOS et al [2005] we formulate two complementary observations: 1) for the “new 
generations” the existence of the agency is a given social fact: they did not participate at its 
formation and at the initial formulation of the social contract; 2)”… some of the agency's clients 
are "recruited" as a result of a violent action made by the agency or that they may become the 
subjects of such an action after they earn the client statute” (op.cit.,p.9). So that, the agency could 
impose a non-voluntary transfer from its members/from association in the favour of others 
clients/non-members. There are at least two reasons for such transfers: 1) the attempt of the 
agency to preserve in a multiple-period time framework a certain level of the global social “net” 
                                                 
4
 It is interesting to note that one could conclude that the association’s members are, at least theoretically speaking, in 
the same position as the non-members. But is not ab initio obviously that the agency is choosing to treat the 
defeating members in the same manner as it treats the non-members. For instance, they could be subjects of certain 
persuasive/punitive actions (in the purpose to prevent the contagion effect as well as the diminution of the agency 
output). 
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utility; 2) the desire of the agency to posses some control mechanism over its own clients/ 
associations. 
The statement about the first reason is in fact the idea that a “mature” agency will have the 
capacity to claim from all the social subjects (including the non-members) a fraction of the social 
output for prudential reasons in order to prevent the changes over time in the perceived social 
utility of its activity. Of course, even if this assertion is accepted, one still could ask if there is 
any special reason for an agency to proceed in this way. A partial argumentation could be 
formulated by observing the fact that if the current level of water production is bellow the target 
levels, due to the changes in the characteristic exploitation conditions and/or to the actions of the 
non-members, some of the agency ’clients could be tempt to denounce the mandate entrusted to 
the agency and, alternatively, to initiate a private exploitation of the oasis. If so the case, output 
per agency members will decrease. In order to avoid this, the agency will try to ensure an optimal 
level of prudential water stocks and to pay the necessary amount of the preventive 
compensation5. 
The second reason could be seen as a complement of the first one. In a certain way, his 
foundation could be funded in the specialization argument: due to the fact that the agency is the 
major entity involved in the water production, it could always argue that its knowledge about 
water production condition justify a change in the level of the output fraction which is destined to 
form the prudential stocks. But such changes in the transfers from the clients/ non-members have 
the potential of a recompense /punishment mechanism. Indeed, there could be described various 
modality of a non-uniform modification of the transfers all based on the same principle: “less 
from the loyal clients / non-problematic non-members - more from infidel clients / problematic 
non-members”. In other words, agency could discriminate in the setting of the transfer level. This 
argument raises the problem of the agency-clients relationship nature. 
Indeed, one could notice the fact that the nature of the social contract is critic for the soundness 
of the entire proposed argumentation. As HIRSHLEIFER [2001; p.126] note: “It is useful to 
distinguish vertical from horizontal social contracts. The vertical alternative, Thomas Hobbes’s 
version, would be represented by arrangements such as hierarchical in the biological realm or 
dictatorship on the human level. John Locke’s version, the horizontal alternative, corresponds to 
more egalitarian arrangements in either sphere”. 
 
If such a distinction is take into account, it could be argued that at the beginning, in the period of 
agency formation, the conglomerate of the social contracts established with its clients is dominate 
by the horizontal version: the agency is too weak to impose a standardized version of the contract 
to clients and non-members. So that, the free will of all the part involved in the formulation of the 
mandate entrusted to the agency is ensured and each individual social subject could propose its 
own version of the contract. But an increasing standardization process accompanies the 
consolidation of the agency position in order to reduce the negotiation costs and even more the 
uniform vertical version of the contract is imposed to all the new generations of the clients and 
non-members.   
One of the major problems with this description consists in the absence of any description for the 
mechanisms that leads such a process. Indeed, if it could be argued that the first clients will agree 
with the introduction of the uniform clauses in the social contract for any new clients, it is 
                                                 
5
 It is obviously that the computation of these two variables is subject of the agency forecasts and they could be 
expressed only in probabilistic terms: it is more accurate to talk about the presumed optimal level of water stockpile 
and the presumed necessary amount of the preventive compensation. 
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unclear that such argument could hold in a multi-generational perspective. In several parts of our 
argumentation, we insist that for a new generation of social subjects the existence of the agency 
as well as the standardized social contract are components of a given social reality. But could this 
claim to be a substitute for a more detailed explanation? Of course, the answer is no. For 
instance, we need to provide at least a reasonable argument for the fact that there is no an 
automatic process of re-negotiation of the social contract between each new generation of 
agency’s member and each generation of clients: the persistence postulate is a necessary 
condition for the substitution of the initial horizontal set of contracts with an standardized 
vertical one argument. 
An incomplete argumentation could be advanced by considering the status quo conditions: if 
there are no changes in the water production conditions and the initial arrangements between the 
clients, non-members and agency are “optimally” ones, there are no reasons for the new 
generations to change them. This statement could be refine by observing that the “optimality” 
attribute is a question of an at least partially subjective judgment. A “new born” potentially client 
could accept of reject the paretian character of the social configuration generated by the initial 
formulation of the social contract. In the last case, he/she could consider that its position in front 
of a “mature” agency is too weak to impose a re-negotiation and consequently could decide to 
become a de jure client or, alternatively, could choose the non-member status6. In the mean time, 
a negotiation association could try to modify some particular clauses of the “social contract” (and 
some time could succeed to do this). But it should be noted the fact that for a global modification 
of the contract there are necessary both a “significant” change of the initial condition as well as 
an involvement of a “critical mass” of the social subjects. In the absence of these conditions, and, 
supplementary, if the 0'C  is not fulfilled, only partial modifications of the “social contract” could 
take place. There existence is conditioned by the capacity of the negotiation associations to 
impose them and also by the possibility to initiate a private concurrent activity by a parallel 
association.  
If this argument holds, then there could be found at least some reasons for the agency to balance 
between the preservation of the usual relationship with the clients and non-member and the 
introduction of some supplementary transfers.   
Suppose that these transfers, ( )ii kT , are continuously from the current state “0” to state “1” and 
also suppose that the agency eventually use a fraction f from their amount to conserve the level 
of the current global utility. 
The dynamic condition involved could be formally described as: 
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6
 As we argue in TALPOS et al [2005; p.18]:” … an individual social subject, confronted with the existence of an 
agency at which formation he did not contribute, has not the possibility, in an isolate way to modify the way of its 
functioning (being able only to accept the quality of non-member) and the clauses of the “social contract”. This is 
thus obliged to sign a “social contract” already written. If its content is not satisfactory, his only solution is that of 
associating with other social subjects to form an association of negotiation / a parallel association...”. 
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:6C The delegation will took place as long as the changes in the agency cost does not generate a 
decrease in the global social “net” utility below the one provided by an individual water 
production. The re-negotiation of the relations between the clients (as principals) and agency (as 
agent) in the water production and distribution could take place only if the involved costs does 
not diminished the global social “net” utility bellow a certain (“zero”) critical level. The 
unilateral “net” transfers from the social output initiated by the agency should preserve the 
critical level of this utility. 
It should be noted that in the proposed framework the transfers could not be seen as a form of 
economic rent gain by the agency as an owner of the economic means involved in the water 
production7. The fact that the agency kept a part of the social output derives in the initial stage 
from the mandate entrusted by its clients. This is the counterpart of the provided services and 
could be seen as a “just” one since is the negotiated price on the base of the clients’ free will. 
Even more, the agency’s members themselves produce the means for water production8 and there 
is no alternatively market for “water services” and consequently there are no “market base” costs 
to form the “competitive price”. A more complex situation could be identified in later stages whit 
the appearance of the parallel associations: 
• A private market of the water production generate a referential for the agency’s production 
costs but 
• The increase of the producers’ number will leads to the asymmetric information problem and 
thus is not an implicit guarantee for the perfect competition existence9. Or, the condition of a 
perfect market is a critic one for the pure rent definition. 
It could be argue that the agency appears as a competitor for the parallel associations and as a 
consequence obtains a rent in competitions with these. The validity of this observation is limited 
by the fact that the agency is not a “normal” economic agent: the scale effect will place it in an 
almost-monopolistic position. In other words, despite the existence of the parallel associations, 
the agency preserves its capacity to control the “largest” fraction of the social output and its 
activity could not be judge in the market usual context. The transfers imposed by the agency have 
from its point of view an operational nature and are destined, at least in principle, to be returned 
in the future periods, to the clients and non-members. So those, in this argumentation, the 
transfers are not a form of rent; only the “normal” fraction aw , which is the price of agency’s 
services, could be seen as a monopolistic rent. The main conclusion that could be derived from 
this argumentation is that the transfers are not the direct result of an exploitation process since 
the conditions for such process are not fulfilled10. But as we had mentioned above, the transfers 
                                                 
7
 For this concept, we use the SØRENSEN [2000;p.20] definition: “Rents are payments to assets that exceed the 
competitive price or the price sufficient to cover costs and therefore exceeding what is sufficient to bring about the 
employment of the asset.” 
 
8
 As a simplification, this is postulate to be true both for the “first” generation of the production means as well as for 
the next generations. The situation in which these means are provided by some parallel associations is more 
complex but could also bee seen in the mandate framework with the agency as a principal. 
9
 As WRIGHT [2000; p.3] notes: “Perfect competition is a quite demanding condition. It implies perfect information 
and a complete absence of any power relations between actors within a market”. 
10
 For a list of such conditions, see for instance WRIGHT [1999; 2000] where are mentioned the inverse 
interdependent welfare principle, the exclusion principle and the appropriation principle: in a “dynamic” sense, the 
transfers does not permanently reduce the clients and non-members’ welfare, nor implies a definitive increase in the 
agency’s members based on their labour effort. 
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are a mean of social control exercised by the agency against its clients as well as against the non-
members by simply imposing for them unequal individual levels11. 
This argumentation is not intended to suggest that there is an ethical justification of the 
transfers12; rather, is just a simple recognition of their existence and of some “economic” reasons 
for this. 
Thus the following definition could be advanced for the transfers: 
:0D The transfers represent operational flows retained by the agency in the current period for 
prudential purposes and destined to be used, totally or partially, to conserve the” net” global 
utility in the next period(s). In opposition with the fraction of the output kept by the agency as a 
counterpart of its services’ prices, the transfers are not an economic rent but could be used by 
the agency as a mean to control its clients and the non-members. 
For analytical purposes, is useful to distinguish between the prudential transfers ( ( )ii kfpT ) and 
social control transfers ( ( )iii kTfc ). Only the first category contributes to the preservation of the 
social utility and represents the “normal” level of the water stockpile, which could be estimate 
base on the historical, and current available information and which is imposed on a “uniform”. 
The second one represents the part that exceeds this “normal” level and is unilaterally established 
by the agency on a “discretionary” base. Of course, in practice it is hard to make a clear 
distinction between these two components due to the fact that there is an asymmetric repartition 
of the information poses by the agency, clients and non-members: the agency could always 
claims that a certain level of the transfers is the “just” one and that level was established base on 
its “long experience” in water production conditions’ forecast. In the mean time, the differences 
between the individual levels of transfers could be much easier observed. The agency could 
proceeds in two opposite/complementary ways if it decides to impose such inequalities: 1) try to 
cover their existence by appealing to “secret” individual clauses with some category of clients/ 
non-members; 2) accept their public recognition as a fidelity bonus in the favor of the best clients/ 
non-problematic members and/or as a punishment for the problematic clients/non-members. The 
adopted solution will depends on the agency’s relative social power and will change over time as 
a consequence of the changes in its capacity to control the social environment: an agency in the 
first formation stages will tend to appeal more to “non-transparent” mechanisms of preferential 
transfers implementation comparative to a “mature” one. In other words, if the agency’s control 
over the social space is beyond some “critic” levels the bonus/punishment practice could be much 
easy recognize as a “standard” one.   
In order to take into account these two components of the transfers, the 6C condition should be 
rewrite as: 
                                                 
11
 Of course, a distinction should be done between the situations in which such inequalities are unilateral imposed by 
the agency and the situations in which they appear as a result of the negotiation associations’ activity. 
12
 The most “sensible” part of the transfers is from this point of view the one which represents the preventive 
compensation (for a more detailed discussion about this aspect, see TALPOS et al [2005]). 
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'C Th
e delegation will took place as long as the changes in the agency cost does not generate a 
decrease in the global social “net” utility below the one provided by an individual water 
production. The re-negotiation of the relations between the clients (as principals) and agency (as 
agent) in the water production and distribution could take place only if the involved costs does 
not diminished the global social “net” utility bellow a certain (“zero”) critical level. The 
unilateral “net” transfers from the social output initiated by the agency should preserve the 
critical level of this utility so that the total level of the social control transfers should not exceed 
the “net” level of the prudential transfers. 
Also the whole definition of the transfers should be change in: 
:0
'D The transfers represent operational flows retained by the agency in the current period for 
prudential purposes and destined to be used, totally or partially, to conserve the” net” global 
utility in the next period(s). In opposition with the fraction of the output kept by the agency as a 
counterpart of its services’ prices, the transfers are not an economic rent but could be used by 
the agency as a mean to control its clients and the non-members. The transfers consists in a 
prudential component which is the solely part that directly contributes to the preservation of the 
social “global” utility and a social control component. The last one could be subject of non-
transparent clauses of the “social contract” or could be public implemented by the agency as 
parts of different bonus/punishment mechanisms. 
 
The relation (10) suggests that the clients / non-members who does not benefit from the agency’ 
bonus or who are subjects of a punishment procedure will react only if the current ratio between 
the prudential “net” transfers and the social control transfers violate condition 6'C . In other 
words, they will not apriori contest any difference between the de facto level of transfers and 
their own estimation of the “normal” level derived from their forecasts of production conditions 
(if they makes such forecasts) and they will not apriori protest against any observed difference in 
the transfers’ individual levels (if they notice such a difference). The contestation of the social 
control transfers will appeal only if this ratio is higher that the “optimal level”. In this paper, we 
do not intend to go in a more detailed analysis of this aspect. We provisory argue that the clients 
and the non-members could agree with the agency that the necessary level of the prudential 
transfers per social subject exceeds the individual capacity to support it. In this case, the actions 
of those social subjects who refuse to accept de facto these transfers but who claims that they are 
de jure entitled to benefit from the prudential stocks on the base of an initial agreement with the 
agency could affect the global social utility and could not be always counterbalanced by an 
increase in the transfers obtained from the loyal subjects/non-problematic non-members13. So 
that, in order to preserve the efficiency of the agency’s prudential actions, the “majority” will 
                                                 
13
 In others words, they knows (or they learn from the experience of the past failures) that the “optimal” solution of 
the “prisoner dilemma” could be obtained only if all the participants at the prudential mechanism managed by the 
agency cooperates. 
 15 
accept the existence of the social control transfers. Discretionary initiated by the agency, these 
transfers are finally accepted on a consensual base by a “significant” number of clients/non-
members. Of course, this argument is too schematic and does only “scratch the problem”. As a 
consequence, in this framework the question of the social subjects’ reaction to the existence of 
the social control transfers remains an open one. 
Another controversial aspect is connected with the “dual” motivation of the agency’s members 
themselves to impose the social control transfers as it is suggested above: 1) to ensure the 
dynamic preservation of the social utility and 2) to have some mechanisms   of control over the 
clients/non-members. If the first component could be seen as a “pure” economic one, 2) could be 
derived not only from the objective to enforced 1) but from a more complex agenda including 
“non-economic” purposes. For instance, the agency could use the transfers in order to reconfigure 
the relative social position of its clients or of its own member’s vis-à-vis to the non-members by 
simply chancing the 
ifc
fp
ratio beyond the “optimal level”1415. Of course, it should be explain how 
the agency’s member’s utility function evolves by incorporating non-economic (“political”) 
decisional variables. But for this purpose, the present framework is too limited so that we simply 
statues that such evolution from an “economic” to a “political” entity could be observed in latest 
development phases of the agency. If this claim holds, then the description of the (re)allocation 
process should incorporate not only a limitative set of “pure” economic factors but rather a 
complex of social and cultural variables. In other words, the analysis should be extended to take 
into account, among others, the influence exercised in this process by the dominant cultural 
paradigm. 
 
 
4. Culture and “vertical” growth: the connection 
 
 
According to the “Merriam-Webster” dictionary, culture is “the act of developing by education, 
discipline, and social experience” or “training or refining of the moral and intellectual faculties”. 
In a different view, COZZ I[1998], understand by culture a “social asset” whose acquisition by an 
agent generates no individual utility but has positive external effects. 
 
In TALPOS et al [2005; p.20] we provide the next definition of the paradigm: “Through 
paradigm we understand the dominant collective mental model that individualizes a society from 
another. This paradigm represents a societal integration factor, by offering common values and 
goals for the members of the society. Also, this represents the subject of some learning and inter-
generational transmission process, which slowly modifies itself, in “long cycles”. 
 
Regarding this definition, one could make the following commentaries:  
It could be noticed that using the concept of “cultural paradigm” tends to reflect the product 
character of collective mindset. In other words, culture is a model produced by the collective 
mindset, through which it sets the accepted values in a social space. The cultural act is a 
                                                 
14
 In this context, we define the relative social position as the relative capacity to control and to benefit from the 
social global output. 
15
 The analysis of the agency’s motives to discriminate some categories of social subjects exceeds the objectives of 
this paper. We just note that, if the agency intends to discriminate, it has in the social transfers a powerful mean. 
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valorisation act which sets the values hierarchy commonly accepted by the society. And through 
this hierarchy, the culture gives the social meanings and sets the social objectives. The culture is 
the act through which the individual and the society answer to the following questions: (i) who 
am I / are we? (ii), which is the meaning of my existence / our existence?  
 
As mentioned before, we consider the paradigm as representing “something much more” then a 
set of “shared values”. This way, one could remark that an interesting definition for the culture as 
“shared values” is, for instance, the definition given in KROEBER and KLUCKHOHN [1952] 
(cited by ADLER [1986]). According to this, culture consist of patterns, explicit and implicit of 
and for behaviours acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement 
of human groups, including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; 
culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as 
conditioning elements of future action. 
 
Culture is: 
− Something that is shared by all or almost all members of some social group; 
− Something that the older members of the group try to pass on to the younger members; and, 
− Something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behaviour, or structures 
one’s perception of the world. 
Our vision is much closer to HOFSTEDE [1991] who defines culture as “the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people 
from another”. Like him, we emphasize that culture is, at least partially, learned, and not only 
inherited. 
 
If culture is the framework in which the society establishes the value’s hierarchy, than it could be 
noticed the fact that different social groups could derived their own combination between the 
“hard” (“material”) values and the “soft” (“spiritual”)16 ones. More exactly, inside the same 
unitary paradigm one could identify different levels of the cultural variables heterogeneity. From 
AU [2000] point of view the defining variable of the intra-cultural heterogeneity could be 
grouped in less than two categories: 1) the ideological heterogeneity (“ideology variation”) and 
motivational heterogeneity (“satisfaction variable”). The ideological heterogeneity reflects those 
intra-cultural heterogeneity determinants leaded to the economic freedom as the public sector 
role, the competition and the processes involved by social assets forming. The motivational 
heterogeneity refers to a complex of economic-social factors. These variables tend to be 
“positively “inter – correlated and both of them tends to influence the level and the structure of 
the social transfers. 
More exactly, it could be noticed the fact that the increase in the ideological coagulation tends to 
be associated with an increase in the dimension and force of the negotiation associations: if the 
number of the social subjects sharing a common vision about how the society should works is 
increasing, it becomes more probably to appears a smaller number of associations with a clear 
agenda of social contract renegotiation.  So that, a higher ideological uniformity will induces a 
higher tendency of the clients/ non-members to control the formation mechanisms and the 
destinations of the social transfers according to a specific set of objectives. These objectives 
could be or could not be the same as the agency’s ones. 
                                                 
16
 These terms are pure intuitive. We do not want to develop any rigorous definition of them.  
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Similarly, greater motivation uniformity is supposing to increase the tendency of the social 
subjects to form parallel associations and to decrease their propensity to delegate to the agency 
the production and the distribution of the social resources. 
In other words, the capacity of the agency to impose social transfers is much weaker in the more 
homogenous social spaces. 
 
Thus, the heterogeneity of the paradigm’ components leads to different relationships between 
the “hard” and “soft” values which are specific for the agency, clients and non-members and 
could, as a consequence, influence the 
ifc
fp
ratio since it affects the architecture of the social 
power. If one admits that this ratio is a factor of the economic growth, than depending on the 
specific configuration of the cultural values, the paradigm will affect the stability of the socio-
economic dynamic. 
 
Formally, for each social group i , the sub-paradigm could be described as a combination of the 
“hard” and “soft” values: 
( )11HS ii βα ⊕  
where: 
HS , denotes the matrix of the “soft” and , respectively, of the “hard” values; 
βα , are the weights ( the relative importance) of the each values type; 
⊕ operator reflects the fact that the combination of the “hard” and “soft” values is a non-“linear” 
one. 
 
With these notations: 
 
Figure 1: The cultural heterogeneity and the stability of the economic growth 
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 where the sub-scripts nmca ,,  denotes the agency, the clients and the non-members. 
 
The thesis that the paradigm affects the relations between different categories of social subjects, 
in general, and, as a consequence, the nature of the primary distribution and redistribution of the 
social resources, and also affects the economic freedom, in particular, represents the main point 
of our argumentation. 
A strong counter-argument against this thesis could be formulated by raising the next question: 
how plausible is to formulate an “indirect” link between some determinants of economic 
development and the cultural variables? And, even more, how significant could be the connection 
between institutional and behavioral variables and the economic dynamic? 
As is explained in 2, we are interested in the long-run causes of the economic trajectory and we 
located this causes in the institutions and social groups interactions. So, such an approach does 
not expressly establish a formal correlation between the paradigm and current economic 
evolution. 
 
It is interesting to note the fact that a limited version of this thesis could be empirically tested: 
:eP In caeteris paribus conditions, the differences in the degree of economic freedom, as a key 
variable of the economic dynamic stability, could be explained by the cultural differential.  
For instance, it is possible to create equivalence between the paradigm components and the 
factors used by HOFSTEDE (1980)17 to explain the cultural differences (using some limitation in 
their sphere and content). These factors are18 : 
  Power Distance (PD); 
 Individualism (I); 
 Masculinity (M); 
 Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI). 
The PD represents the acceptance degree by the members of society that the power (and all 
which could be associated with it) is unequal distributed. 
In a high power distance society, inequality is reckoned as natural, the power-relationships being 
the foundation of society. Therefore, to hold the power is essential, who hold it defining the 
content of the society’s basic values. The dependence relations are a main feature for the great 
majority of such type of society’s members (who are placed outside of the power or on the lowest 
level of it). Instead, the independence is an attribute for those who concentrate decisions, an 
elitist socio-political, economic, cultural or even racial minority, designated by public choice or 
auto-designated. The political system is characterized by the small dimension political class 
(which could be assimilated with an oligarchy), which assure the power, and the elective process 
                                                 
17
 Realized in 1968-1973 starting from approximately 66 non-socialist countries, this study collected information 
from more than 117000 forms, completed by the IBM employees in this countries  
18
 For this analyzes purposes, the main advantage in using these factors is the quantification of the relevant elements, 
which could be used, in an empirical approach of the mentioned thesis.  The factors interpretation realized here is 
larger that the one strictly derived from this study. 
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is dominated by whose have access to the basic resources. In terms of resources collection and 
allocation, the power holders establish what is necessary, how much is necessary and whom is 
necessary a certain resource. Governs are autocrat and centralized. In economical structure, 
agriculture and low value added industrial sector are high-weighted.  From social point of view, 
the middle class is low-weighted, an important social rule being associated with public 
administrative personnel. There are latent conflicts between powerful and powerless. 
By opposite, in a low power distance index society, the basic belief is that the inequality must to 
be minimized. The way in which power is used is essential, who’s exercised it doing this for 
those are represented by them and starting from the essential values defined by the society. The 
dominant relations in society have a multiple and mutual interdependence character. Temporary 
power-holders haven’t a total independence in exercising of power. The political system is 
dynamic; the political class is in a continuous change; the political power is obtained as a result 
of elective process rigorous supervised by civil society. The resources collection and allocation 
process is transparent and public debated, with widely wealth distribution. For local community 
is allotted a strong decisional power. The judicial system has a preventive character. In 
economical structure, high-technology industrial sector and services are high-weighted. It is 
registered high social mobility and significant importance for middle class. The conflicts don-t 
missed, but they are accepted as a progress sources.       
 
UAI quantifies the tolerance degree accepted by the society’s members for the anxiety induced by 
the ambiguous and unstructured future situations. 
The societies with high uncertainty avoidance are concerned on build-up some methods to 
minimized this anxieties. Therefore, plans are essentials, based on detailed and rigorous 
forecasting. Such societies are, typically, young democracies or developing countries for which 
the changes are of “fissure” type (even violent), being inherent, with an important political, social 
and economic impact. The political system is dominated by the personalities with a high-
recognized expertise. The resources collection and allocation process is centralized, detailed 
planning – based, being carry out by a huge administrative apparatus, which dominate the 
society. It is specific a strong needs for consensus, so that members of such culture demonstrate a 
low tolerance for dissident opinions and tendencies.     
Per a contrario, the societies with a low level of uncertainty avoidance admit the fact that the risk 
and uncertainty belong to the real life, couldn’t be totally avoided. Creativity and innovation 
represent two significant features. Such societies are, typically, developed countries or old and 
strong traditional democracies, where the changes are cyclic, with high frequency and gradual 
impact. The political system was outlined in time, and the political class is in a continuous 
change; the differences between political generations are not very significant. The resources 
collection and allocation process is decentralized, the “subsidiary principle” being recognized and 
applied; corrections in the (re) allocation mechanisms are frequently. Public debates are 
numerous, with various themes, and different opinions and currents are accepted.      
 
I measure the identity: communitarian or personal, respectively the relations established by the 
individuals with others members of the community. A collectivistic society (with a strong 
communitarian identity) valorises the group, the collective space, which create a perception of a 
common propriety. A series of values, such as liberty or solidarity are conditioned by the group’s 
life and beliefs. Equality/uniformity is preferred to equity.  Such countries are, typically, low-
developed societies, with centralized, paternalistic, time-durable and strong popular support 
governments. The social mobility is small, its dynamic confines to the affiliation social and 
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demographic category. The traditional economical sectors are high-weighted. The resources 
collection and allocation process are focused on, rather, general shorts and long - term needs 
satisfaction, pursue, primary, regional and social equalization, with a less consideration for 
efficiency index or long – term interest satisfaction. Collectivism is characterized by a strong 
distinction between in- and out-group members. This implies a strong preference for different 
bonus mechanisms for best clients/ non-problematic members versus problematic clients/non-
members.  
An individualistic society valorised the own “ego”, family, individual and private space. Time 
belongs to individuals, and values such as liberty and solidarity are determined by personal 
beliefs. There is a great appreciation for efficiency, ambitious and life success. The equity is 
more important than equality. Such countries are, typically, high-developed societies, with a 
powerful industry and a high degree of urbanization. Such societies reckon a significant role for 
local administration and regional governments. They are characterized by a high social mobility; 
group borders do not restrict its dynamic, movement between groups depending primary by the 
own willing. The middle class is very important, representing an “engine” for social and 
economical development. The resources collection and allocation mechanism follow principles 
such as efficiency or stimulating of high potential regional and economic area, with a risk of 
developing discrepancy’s creation between regions or communities. 
 
M does not imply the discrimination of the cultural values on sexes; rather it reflects some 
fundamental values shared by all society members. More precisely, it is considered that the 
“masculine” societies are those where the dominant values are connected with the social 
affirmation, the material results and the decisional freedom. In this conditions the performance is 
measured using the terms of reaching and maintaining a reference social status and the material 
achievements are considered more important that the spiritual ones. Public services or 
educational system are oriented to performance. The economic growth is more important than 
nature or environmental protection. The political system is centred upon competition, and 
specific member of political class is middle age (or third - age) male, with rich political expertise 
or wealth. The (re) allocation process are modelled around clearly defined performance criteria 
and pursues the economic growth as an ultimate objective. In opposition, the “feminine” societies 
have as dominant values: the equality, the solidarity and the consensus, the social tension 
avoidance, the centralization of the social-economic trades and the conservation or the spiritual 
values, tided to the “quality of life” and to the inter-human relationships. Public systems and 
services are focused on social adaptation environmental protection is more important than pure 
economical growth, and social responsibility represents a main feature of organizations belonging 
to this kind of culture. There are not significant inferences between public/professional sphere 
and private space. The (re) allocation process pursues to insure equal development conditions for 
everyone, together with high social protection. 
 
We consider that taking them into consideration and using them to characterize three types of 
paradigm, characteristic for three types of societies, could be useful: 
 “X” society  (closed society); 
 "Y" society (semi-opened society); 
 “Z" society (opened society). 
 
Closed societies are characterized by the tendency (at least formal shown) of attenuation at the 
unequal power distribution level, by a pronounced collectivism, by promoting the “feminine 
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“values (searching for consensus and not for competition) and by a pronounced incertitude and 
risk aversion. 
 
In semi-opened societies all these parameters have medium values; the opened societies valorize 
more the acceptance of the unequal power distribution, as “natural” status, the individualism and 
the social affirmation, the performance and the material result, the incertitude acceptance as a 
status, which could generate action opportunities19. 
These cultural variables influence both the level and the structure of the production and transfers. 
In the society with a high level of PD, the delegation process to the agency is seen as a “natural” 
process and the inequality between the exerting capacities of different rights is pregnant pointed 
out. So that, the agency has the control over the production/distribution conditions and reallocate 
the resources in an authoritarian manner; the discrepancies in the 
ifc
fp
ratio are pronounced and 
even more they are perceived as “naturally” ones. The associations have a reduced negotiating 
power and they are not able to appear like an important social agent in the (re) allocation 
processes.    
If the level of UAI is very high, the social subjects will be tempted, in a significant way, to delegate 
their rights’ exertion, having as a purpose the social dispersion of the involved risks. The agency is 
seen as a “safety structure” that has as the main function the creation of a “safe” social 
environment. As a consequence, the level of the prudential transfers is high and the punishment 
component of the social control transfers is largely accepted. 
In the societies with a high level of M, the accent on the individual achievement will have an 
adverse effect to the delegation process: the social subjects will prefer to exert themselves a 
higher volume of their rights. The agency controls a reduced fraction of the social output. The 
performance criteria are extremely important in the clauses of the social contract and there is a 
strong tendency to form private associations. Thus, in these societies the agency controls a 
smaller part of the social output and the prudential transfers are less important. 
In a similar way, for a high level of I, the social subjects will prefer, in a reduced degree, to 
delegate the exerting of their rights and the agency will have a smaller size. In the structure of the 
prudential transfers the weight of the preventive compensation will be reduce and the social control 
transfers will be much easier contested. 
 
The structural and institutional aspects of an economic system could be, at least partially, 
captured by using the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. This index measures the 
degree of economic freedom present in five major areas: 
 
 Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises; 
 Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights; 
 Access to Sound Money; 
 Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners; 
 Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business. 
 
The components of Area 1 indicate the extent of country’s reliance on the freedom of individual 
economic subjects’ choices and power of deregulated markets, by measuring the intensity of the 
                                                 
19
 For more details about the characteristics of this societal taxonomy, see TALPOS et al [2005]. 
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substitution effect between the private resources allocation and the public expenditures, the extent 
of using private rather than public enterprises to produce goods and services and the level of 
taxes on economic resources in the redistribution process. 
Area 2 deals with the key ingredients of the legal system which are compatible with the economic 
freedom: rule of law,” security” of property rights, an independent judiciary, and an impartial 
court system. 
The Area 3 treats the subject of the financial stability. The components of this Area are correlated 
with the consistency of monetary policy (and of monetary authorities) with long-term price 
stability. They also measure the easy use degree of other currencies via domestic and foreign 
banks. 
The elements of Area 4 are designed to reflect a wide variety of restraints that affect international 
exchanges. These include tariffs, quotas, hidden administrative restrains, exchange rate and 
capital controls. In order to get a high rating in this area, a country must have low tariffs, a large 
external trade sector, efficient customs administration, a freely convertible currency, and few 
controls on capital.  
The Area 5 reflects the conditions of the domestic credit market (the banks ownership, the 
commercial banks sector competition, the credit extension, the avoidance of interest rate controls 
and regulations), the characteristics of the labour markets (minimum wages, dismissal 
regulations, centralized wage setting, extensions of union contracts to non-participating parties, 
unemployment benefits, and conscription), and the regulation of business activities (price 
controls, administrative conditions for new businesses, government bureaucracy, import and 
export permits, business licenses, tax assessments etc.). 
 
 
5. Some empirical evidences 
 
 
The connections between the EFW index and the HOFSTEDE’s cultural variables are revealed in 
the Annex 1. The sample includes data for the 25 members of the European Union. The analysis 
period is between (annually data) 1996-2006. The model is specified with the inclusion of 
random effects: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )120=+++= itititititititit EwithCEFW ενεβνα  
 
where C is the matrix of the cultural variables. 
 
The values of the Student, of the Durbin-Watson-statistics, of the Akaike and Schwartz info 
criterion as well as the tests for the autocorrelations in the itε residuals (not reported here) 
suggests that the results are “acceptable” from a statistical point of view. 
According to the results listed in Annex 1, all the implied cultural variables seem to exercise a 
statistical significant influence on the EFW index. Since the values of this index are ranked from 
“5” (the “worst” case) to “1” (the “best” case), Power Distance and Individualism affects directly 
the degree of economic freedom, while Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance exercise an 
“indirect” influence on EFW. From these, the Masculinity is the weakest explanatory variable. 
It should be noticed that the validation force of this test is affected by methodological and 
econometric problems. 
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For instance, the presumption of the caeteris paribus conditions for all the EU countries is a 
“heroic” one, since there are important differences between the “old” and the “new” members. 
Also, the appeal to the HOFSTEDE’s cultural variables could be criticized due to the fact that 
these have obviously a certain self-referential in the “occidental” culture and are not able to 
sustain a more accurate distinction between the characteristics of the cultural artefacts. 
 In the econometric field should be mentioned the relatively small number/periods of observation 
and the fact that the use of some fix effect methods for the pool estimation could change the 
results. 
Despite these limitations, we consider that such tests could be used on a largely scale in order to 
provide a stronger empirical support. However, it seems that there is a case for eP  and is justified 
a more detailed analysis. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The proposed model is an attempt to describe the complex web of the interactions between the 
agency, its clients and the non-members in the production/(re) distribution processes. 
It argues that there is an economic base for the mandate theory and it tries to explain the causes 
and the formation mechanisms of the social transfers, as a key ingredient of the social power 
system, system that is presumed to be the “basis” of the long-run socio-economic evolutions. 
 
One could notice a lot of week points in the entire advanced argumentation. Among them, could 
be mentioned the intrinsic limitation of the mandate theory which are not solve; the absence of an 
solid argumentation for the multigenerational evolutions of the relations between agency and the 
others social subjects; the “blank field” of the changes in the agency’s utility function with the 
inclusion of some “politic” variables; the obscure description of the 
ifc
fp
ratio; the not enough 
developed analysis of the linkage between the cultural variables and the social transfers, the 
absence of any description of the possible “transmission” mechanism of the “institutional” and 
“behavioural” impact on the sustainable development as well as the absence of any EU case study 
particularity description and many others things. 
 
But, beyond of the unfinished character of the construction, the model is intended to promote a 
better understanding of the social space and to support an “optimal” selection of its configuration 
in order to sustain the “vertical” socio-economic evolution. Finally, the last “frontier” of this 
evolution is designed inside our own fears and hopes. 
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Annex 1: The connection between the cultural variables and the economic freedom 
 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period random effects)  
Sample: 1996 2006   
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 25   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 275  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (degree of freedom corrected) 
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
C 2.509132 0.185128 13.55350 0.0000 
P -0.002766 0.000359 -7.710897 0.0000 
I -0.007580 0.001454 -5.211676 0.0000 
M 0.001607 0.000396 4.053999 0.0001 
UAI 0.005008 0.000765 6.544060 0.0000 
Random Effects (Period)     
1996--C 0.214275    
1997--C 0.136829    
1998--C 0.115664    
1999--C 0.079586    
2000--C 0.047132    
2001--C -0.054718    
2002--C -0.055231    
2003--C -0.102886    
2004--C -0.094387    
2005--C -0.094387    
2006--C -0.191877    
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Period random S.D. / Rho 0.140310 0.1392 
Idiosyncratic random S.D. / Rho 0.348887 0.8608 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
R-squared 0.244132 Mean dependent variable 1.051109 
Adjusted R-squared 0.232934 S.D. dependent variable 0.398354 
S.E. of regression 0.348887 Sum squared residuals 32.86504 
F-statistic 21.80130 Durbin-Watson stat 0.121817 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 Un-weighted Statistics   
     
R-squared 0.219307     Mean dependent variable 2.360531 
Sum squared residuals 37.78677     Durbin-Watson stat 0.133998 
Source of data: Hofstede Geert, (2003) & Index of Economic Freedom (2006) 
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